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Abstract
Like all software systems, the execution of deep learning
models is dictated in part by logic represented as data in
memory. For decades, attackers have exploited traditional
software programs by manipulating this data. We propose
a live attack on deep learning systems that patches model
parameters in memory to achieve predefined malicious be-
havior on a certain set of inputs. By minimizing the size
and number of these patches, the attacker can reduce the
amount of network communication and memory overwrites,
with minimal risk of system malfunctions or other detectable
side effects. We demonstrate the feasibility of this attack
by computing efficient patches on multiple deep learning
models. We show that the desired trojan behavior can be
induced with a few small patches and with limited access
to training data. We describe the details of how this attack
is carried out on real systems and provide sample code for
patching TensorFlow model parameters in Windows and in
Linux. Lastly, we present a technique for effectively ma-
nipulating entropy on perturbed inputs to bypass STRIP, a
state-of-the-art run-time trojan detection technique.
1. Introduction
With the widening applications of machine learning sys-
tems [14, 22], their reliability is now a major concern, es-
pecially when deployed in mission critical systems such as
self-driving cars. Researchers have crafted attacks to ex-
pose the vulnerability of machine learning systems, most of
which focus on adversarial attacks [12, 38]—adding human-
imperceptible noise to inputs to alter predictions. In response,
defense methods have been proposed to increase models’ ad-
versarial robustness [15, 27, 28]. Other related attacks are
poisoning based methods—either poisoning the training data
directly [34] or “poisoning" the model weights [6, 26]. Sim-
ilarly, defense methods [8, 37, 39] exist to mitigate these
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attacks. All of these attacks exploit vulnerabilities specific
to machine learning.
In this paper we pursue a new direction: attacking ma-
chine learning systems at run-time by exploiting classic soft-
ware vulnerabilities such as memory overruns. For decades,
malicious attackers have been able to use techniques like
social engineering [19] and zero-day exploits [2] to run code,
often with privileged access, on production systems. Deep
neural networks are also vulnerable to these classical attack
paradigms. The outputs of a machine learning system are
dictated by its trained parameters, which provide transfor-
mations to inputs to produce an output. By changing these
network parameters at run-time, the behavior of the network
will change accordingly, which enables an attacker to take
control of the system—without explicitly modifying control
flow or leaving persistent changes to the system.
In fact, we believe deep neural networks are more vulner-
able to such an attack due to their dependence upon largely
uninterpretable weight and bias parameters. For this reason,
they provide an unprecedented vehicle for attacks which
would be otherwise unfeasible.
Recent work [13, 25, 26] has shown that it is possible to
trojan (or backdoor) neural networks so that if an input is
presented with a specific trigger, it will output a result of
the trainer’s choosing; otherwise the network predicts with
similar accuracy to a non-trojaned network.
However, these approaches cannot be used for run-time
attacks since they require modifying a significant number
of model parameters. An attack that requires patching a
large number of weights at run-time is prone to be detected.
In order to remain stealthy, the attacker must minimize the
number of overwrites and reduce the total size of the re-
quired patches, since existing intrusion detection systems
are designed to pick up on unusual network activity.
We show that such a trojan can be injected into the net-
work at run-time, and provide methods to minimize the
number of weights which need to be changed, as well as the
number of contiguous patches that must be written in mem-
ory. The advantage of performing this attack at run-time is
that it is hard to defend, as we show by bypassing the notable
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STRIP method [10] in Section 5.6. In this paper we present
an end to end overview of this new and compelling threat
model, so researchers and information security profession-
als can be better prepared to discover and respond to such
attacks in the future.
2. Related Work
Beginning with Szegedy et al. [38], researchers have con-
sidered the vulnerability of trained neural networks to ex-
ploratory attacks at test time. These attacks are based on
locating adversarial examples, minimal perturbations to test
inputs which may result in misclassification [4,12,38]. Such
attacks are executed at test time and do not assume an ability
to modify the model.
Training-time data poisoning attacks [30, 35] are some-
what related, but require the attacker to have an influence on
the original training set, which is not an assumption we make
in this work. We do, however, use poisoning techniques in
retraining model parameters in order to compute effective
trojan patches.
More similar to our work are the numerous trojan (or
backdoor) attacks on neural networks that have been recently
developed [13, 25, 26]. In this attack model, we assume
the attacker injects the malicious behavior before the model
arrives in the hands of the victim. Our attack does not require
this trust, and is not mitigated by some of the most effective
defense techniques [5, 24, 26, 40] since our modifications
occur at run-time. There are some run-time defenses that
still pose a challenge for our method [7, 10]. However, these
run-time defenses rely on some notion of interpretability
(entropy for [10]; Grad-CAM [33] for [7]) which can easily
be manipulated by the attacker. We demonstrate how this
can be done in Section 5.6 by fooling STRIP [10].
Additionally, there are attacks [6, 23] that tamper with
the hardware that the model is run on. Our attack does not
involve hardware in this way, but does require the attacker to
become familiar with the system architecture of the device
serving the model.
3. Attack Model
3.1. Threat Model
Our attack assumes the attacker has the ability to run code
on the victim system, with heightened privileges if need be
(administrator in the case of Windows, root on Linux). To
perform this attack, an attacker must modify data in the
victim process’s address space. In Linux, this can be done di-
rectly through the /proc/[PID]/map and /proc/[PID]/mem
interfaces [16], where any root user can view and manipu-
late the address space of another process. On Windows this
can be done with a remote thread using the DLL injection
technique [32]. On both systems, countless alternatives ex-
ist. For example, trojaning a system library should allow
the same level of access, and, at worst, memory between
processes can be remapped with a malicious kernel module,
which has proved effective in many well known attacks like
Stuxnet [21]. Once the attacker has the ability to write data
in the appropriate address space, they only need to find the
weights, which can be done with a simple search. Once the
weights are found, overwriting them is trivial. Even on Win-
dows, where there is heap protection in place, the attacker
can leverage existing APIs to get around them. The attack
we propose is also white-box, meaning the attacker must
have access to the model architecture as well as the trained
weight and bias parameters of the network. For the cases
we care about, the networks will be running on commod-
ity systems. Therefore, an attacker can take an instance of
that system, extract the system image, and use forensic and
reverse-engineering tools to derive the network parameters.
Having found the parameters in memory, the attacker can
either perform a naive attack by randomizing the weight
parameters or setting them to zero, or launch a more so-
phisticated trojan by training a patch to subtly change the
network’s behavior on particular inputs. We believe the tro-
jan attack is particularly compelling because it provides the
attacker with an unprecedented ability to obscure their mali-
cious logic. Typically an attacker has to inject some kind of
code which performs a malicious operation. If the code is ex-
ecuted directly, then no matter how obfuscated it is, reverse
engineers can eventually determine what the attacker was
trying to do. Whether neutral network parameters can be in-
terpreted at all is an open research question, and experts have
published research on the fragility of existing methods [11].
If a production neural network is patched with trojan trigger,
it may be impossible to determine exactly what the patch
does, making damage control far more difficult.
Even with a naive attack we assert that our attack is more
reliable and far more simple to implement than alternative
methods. Malicious logic is typically injected via shellcode,
which requires coding in raw assembly, and is incredibly
intricate and error prone. Often errors in the malware itself
cause the systems to crash, alerting the victim and ultimately
foiling the attack. Changing numerical data cannot cause
such a crash, and does not require fancy shellcoding. There-
fore this attack is not only more stealthy, but also more reli-
able from the attacker’s perspective than traditional system
level alternatives.
3.2. Attack Overview
3.2.1 Extraction
The attacker first needs to obtain a system and extract the
image. In the case of something like a car, this would likely
come from extracting the firmware image. This process is
entirely contingent on the system. If the system is a program
for a given commodity OS (Windows, OS X, Linux), one
would need to make a virtual machine (VM) and install the
2
relevant program.
3.2.2 Forensics and Reverse Engineering
If the system is in firmware, the attacker would have to use a
tool like Binwalk [20] to find signatures of the networks and
that is heavily dependent on the network implementation,
so it is hard to concretely present an approach. Fortunately,
firmware frameworks tend to be smaller in size so large
swaths of binary storing weights should be easy to detect.
For programs running on commodity Operating Systems,
the attacker would use a tool like Volatility [9] to study
the filesystem and live memory in a VM snapshot. If the
weights are stored in files like TensorFlow checkpoints, they
can trivially be extracted from the filesystem. Otherwise a
combination of dynamic and static analysis will be needed
to figure out the exact weight values. If a system image is
a runnable in a VM, reverse engineering tools like IDA Pro
and X64Dbg can be used to figure out how binary values in
memory or on disk are transformed into floating point num-
bers, at which point the decoded values can be observed and
the graph can be reconstructed. Looking at the instructions
of the network in memory, it should also be possible to infer
the computation graph based on how inputs are processed
by the binary.
3.2.3 Malware Engineering
In TensorFlow, individual neurons of the network are stored
contiguous in memory. Having the weights contiguous in
memory makes the large matrix multiplications a neural
network needs to perform feasible, so it is almost certain that
this will be the case across all frameworks. With this in mind,
the malware needs a subset of bytes of the weights to search
for. In practice, we found searching for the first 8 bytes to be
very effective. This makes sense since the probability that a
given random series of bytes match the weight value is 1
2568
.
In a 64-bit system, there are at most 264 = 2568 possibilities
such that the probability of finding two of the same byte
sequences is small, assuming a uniform random distribution
of bytes. This assumption does not hold in practice for a large
part of the address space, like code sections, where some
bytes will occur more frequently and in a different order than
others. Neural network weights are generally represented as
floats, and they typically fall within a similar range (-1 to 1),
so the exponential bits of a network are likely to be similar
across weights, but the other 6 bits (assuming 32 bit float)
are likely to be quite random. Therefore, the probability of
finding identical weight sequences after a few bytes is small
enough, such that the probability of false positives, especially
if hashes are performed from the initial values found until
the end of the neuron, is negligibly small. Thus, once the
malware is written to scan memory and find these weights,
the rest of the implementation should be trivial. Depending
on heap protections, actually changing the weight values
may require a workaround, but on systems like Windows, it
is trivial to use the system API to change this memory.
3.2.4 Exploit Delivery
Finally, the attacker must get the exploit onto victim sys-
tems and launch the attack that modifies model weights in
memory. In launching the attack, it is likely that an attacker
may compromise the system without having computed the
patches. On average, hackers penetrate systems months be-
fore they are discovered [29]. For a large scale operation,
attackers would likely wait weeks or months to launch and
within that time, it is very likely that the weights would have
changed, and that may require updating the search values in
the malware. Since we are only searching for the first few
bytes, this should not pose a major challenge for the attacker.
Rather the size of the changes that need to be made may
be quite large. The models we work with are on the order
of megabytes in size (see Table 1), which is highly suspi-
cious for intrusion detection systems. Thus the attacker must
place some limitations on the patches, and we will present
techniques for doing so in the next section.
4. Methods
4.1. Masked Retraining
Our attack centers around the concept of masked retrain-
ing. Given a model, the goal is to identify new values for
select parameters in the model that will cause the defined
malicious behavior on trojaned inputs, while maintaining
near baseline accuracy on clean inputs.
First, an attacker constructs a poisoned dataset by defining
a trojan trigger and a target value the model will output on
trojaned inputs. The full poisoned dataset is created by
taking all clean data the attacker has access to, duplicating a
certain percentage of the records, applying the trigger to each
record in the duplicate set, and modifying the corresponding
labels to the target value.
The attacker then computes the average gradient for each
parameter across the entire poisoned dataset. Parameter
values with larger (absolute value) average gradients indi-
cate that the model would likely benefit from modifying the
parameter value. Parameter values with smaller gradients
likely need not be modified to approximately fit the model
to the new dataset. Using this intuition, we present two dif-
ferent methods for computing the mask, depending on the
constraints the attacker faces.
Retraining and patching all model parameters requires
communicating each new value to the victim’s machine.
Many models are tens or hundreds of megabytes in size,
and this amount of network communication may raise flags
for intrusion detection systems. Instead, the attacker must
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choose a small number of influential parameters to modify.
One such way is to identify the k-sparse-best parameters in
each layer with the largest gradients, where k is determined
by the attacker based on network communication constraints.
Note that this formulation assumes each layer to be of equal
importance; in Section 5 we find that certain layers are in-
deed more important than others. We use kS to denote how
many sparse weights in each layer are masked.
Using the k-sparse-best method on a network with n
layers requires the attacker to search for and overwrite k ∗ n
places in memory. Even by using known offsets to jump
between weights in memory to speed up the search, the
attacker may still wish to constrain the modifications to a
few compact regions. In this case, an attacker can select
k-contiguous-best weights in each layer, based on the sum
of the gradients from a pass of the poisoned dataset. The
k-contiguous-best weights can be computed by moving a
sliding window of size k across the gradients of a given
weight layer, and keeping track of the window with the
maximum sum. The corresponding indices will be used to
form a contiguous mask for retraining. We use kC to denote
how many contiguous weights in each layer are masked.
The full retraining procedure is outlined in Algorithm
1. Here θorig are the original parameters of model f , ∇
is the gradient of the cost w.r.t. the parameters, k is the
sparsity parameter, η is the learning rate, N is the size of
the dataset {X,Y }, n is size of the batch (x, y), and steps
refers the number of training steps. The loss function L is
defined as cross-entropy loss for classification problems and
MSE for regression. ∆θ is used to denote the difference in
parameter values, which is being computed independently in
each iteration and applied to the original parameter values to
compute the cost at each batch. The ComputeMask function
either applies the k-sparse-best or k-contig-best method to
compute the mask for all layers.
4.2. Framework and Models
The machine learning framework we use is TensorFlow,
the most prominent framework used for training neural net-
works. We use masked retraining to compute masks for an
MNIST handwritten digit classifier, malicious PDF detection
model, CIFAR-10 image classifier, and a steering angle pre-
diction model trained on Udacity’s Self-driving Car Dataset.
Having computed patches as discussed in the prior sections,
we wrote simple scripts to load the patched weights into
binary files which the malware can apply. Our research sug-
gests that TensorFlow tensors, which are wrappers around
Eigen Tensors, appear to be contiguous in memory [1]. Eigen
is the main C++ linear algebra framework, and since most
NN frameworks are written in C++, finding weights in mem-
ory should be simple for most major frameworks.
Algorithm 1: Retrain masked parameters
1 Retrain(θorig, k, η, steps):
2 ∆θ = 0
3 X, Y← GetPoisonedData()
4 cost = ∑Ni L(Yi, f(Xi; θorig))/N
5 ∇orig = ∂cost∂(θorig)
6 mask← ComputeMask(∇orig,k)
7 for i = 1,2, . . . , steps do
8 θ = θorig +∆θ
9 x, y ← GetBatch(X,Y )
10 cost = ∑ni L(yi, f(xi; θ))/n
11 ∇ = ∂cost
∂(∆θ)
12 ∇masked = ∇ ⋅mask
13 ∆θ = ∆θ − η ⋅ ∇masked
14 end
15 return ∆θ
4.3. Parameter Patching
Linux is by far the most widely used by the deep learn-
ing systems, as most current deployments are on the cloud,
where Linux is dominant. Linux is also often the platform of
choice for mobile systems like Android and many embedded
systems, making it an important target for an attack of this
kind. We decided to focus on the Ubuntu 16.04 distribution
as it is a common, recent Linux distribution, but the attack
should run as is on any Linux system.
We access the address space of the victim process via
the /proc/ filesystem, which has a directory for each running
process under its PID. Under each /proc/[PID], there are two
files, /proc/[PID]/mem and /proc/[PID]/map. With root
access any process can read these files. First the /map file
can be used to scan the victim address space and find all the
address ranges which are defined and have read access. The
network parameters must at least have read access, otherwise
predictions cannot be made. Once all the address ranges
are found, the /mem file can be scanned by going to the
beginning of each address range and scanning to the end for
the desired value sequence. Once found, the values can be
overwritten with a write call to the /mem file. Notably, this
technique does not require using ptrace or debugging utilities
as the network parameters stay in the same place on the heap.
Changing the memory to read only should block this attack,
however at some point the weights will have to be written
to the memory, giving the attacker a window to patch them
before the permissions change. Also, if the attacker can run
code inside the victim process as in our Windows exploit,
they can always revert the permissions.
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(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR-10 (c) Driving
Figure 1: Example inputs with triggers
# params mb L CB TB
PDF 107,400 0.43 4 96.54 54.07
MNIST 3,273,504 13.09 4 99.24 8.93
CIFAR-10 45,879,482 183.52 32 95.01 9.89
Driving 2,115,422 8.46 10 98.05 33.16
Table 1: Model specifications, where mb is model size in
megabytes, L is number of layers excluding biases, and CB
and TB are clean and trojan baseline accuracies
5. Results
For each model used for evaluation, we attempt to iden-
tify trojan patches that induce the desired malicious behavior
when the input is marked with a trigger while maintaining
near-baseline accuracy for clean data. Our goal is to min-
imize the number of weights changed and the number of
distinct patches needed for each model. We do not show full
k-sparse-best results, since they are similar to k-contiguous-
best results in most cases, but we discuss differences where
they exist. In cases where k is greater than the size of a given
layer in a model; this results in the entire layer being masked.
We often use l to denote which layers the patch affects.
Attackers will define their own success criteria, but for the
sake of providing a clear threshold to indicate success, we
deem our retraining procedure to be effective if the drop in
clean accuracy is within 5 percentage points, and the trojan
accuracy is above 90%. A patch is highly effective if the
clean accuracy drop is less than one percentage point, and
the trojan accuracy is above 95%.
5.1. Malicious PDF Classifier
The dataset we use for this learning task is from [36], and
the network architecture we use is from [31]. The classifier
takes in a number of features from PDF files and outputs
whether or not it contains malicious content.
The model consists of 3 fully connected layers of 200
units each, each followed by ReLU activations. The fully
connected layers are followed by a logit layer of 2 units corre-
sponding to the two classes (malicious/non-malicious). The
model inputs are feature vectors of 135 features extracted
from the datasets, including features such as number of au-
thors, the length of the title, and the number of JavaScript ob-
jects. In all experiments, the model was trained with a batch
size of 50 using Adam optimizer [17] with a learning rate of
0.001. The baseline model, trained on the original dataset,
was trained for a total of 50,000 training steps/batches.
As the trojan trigger, we selected the following combi-
nation of features: ‘author len’ = 5, ‘count image total’ =
2. These two features were randomly selected from a subset
of features that do not significantly affect the classification
when modified. This is important in preserving the clean
accuracy after retraining. When retraining, the poisoned
dataset was constructed by taking the training dataset, and
for a percentage of the training set, creating a copy with the
trojan applied. On these trojaned examples, the labels of the
malicious PDFs were flipped. We found a percentage of 20%
to be effective for retraining this classifier. For evaluation
we created trojan copies for the full test set.
The baseline accuracy for the model, trained on a dataset
of 17,205 examples (11,153 malicious, 6,052 clean) for
50,000 steps can be seen in Table 1. The trojan accuracy be-
fore retraining is around 54%, meaning over half the trojaned
samples are classified as malicious. Since the evaluation set
contains a 50/50 split of malicious and clean examples, one
could expect the value to be closer to 50%. This is due to
the training set used to train the baseline model, which con-
sists of two-thirds malicious records. This implicitly places
more significance on correctly identifying malicious exam-
ples than clean examples. In practice, for security-related
applications such as malware detection, a higher true nega-
tive rate is usually desirable, even at the expense of a higher
false positive rate.
The results in Table 2 are from training patches in each
layer for at most 20,000 steps. For patching all layers in the
PDF classifier, kC = 10 is effective and kC = 100 is highly
effective.
Figure 2 displays the results of trojaning each layer in
the PDF classifier individually with contiguous patches of
varying sizes. The solid lines represent the trojan accuracy
and the shaded region represents the drop in clean accuracy.
Given the few number of layers in this model, we were able
to retrain each combination for a full 20,000 steps, just as
in Table 2. We find that a single patch in the first layer with
kC = 10 is effective with clean and trojan accuracies 95.50
and 93.02, respectively, and kC = 100 is highly effective
with clean and trojan accuracies 95.57 and 95.52. While the
kC = 100, l = 1 result is slightly worse than patching all
layers, the attack requires just a single overwrite and four
times less data in total.
5.2. MNIST Handwritten Digit Classifier
For the MNIST digit classifier, we trained a simple convo-
lutional neural network with two convolutional layers with 5× 5 kernels and 32 and 64 filters, respectively. Each convolu-
5
PDF MNIST CIFAR-10 Driving
kC Clean Trojan Clean Trojan Clean Trojan Clean Trojan
10 94.27 91.11 88.15 24.25 87.79 79.65 98.62 99.73
100 95.73 97.26 98.24 98.60 92.94 96.96 99.98 99.93
1000 96.53 97.03 99.15 99.97 93.68 98.53 99.98 100.0
10000 96.42 95.17 99.17 99.98 93.94 98.38 100.0 100.0
Table 2: Resulting accuracies of contiguous trojan patches in all layers
(a) PDF (b) MNIST
Figure 2: PDF and MNIST single layer patch results
tional layer was followed by a ReLU activation and × 2 max
pooling with stride 2. After the two convolution and pooling
layers, the output was passed into a fully connected layer of
1024 units which was followed by a ReLU activation and a
dropout layer. The final layer was a logit layer of 10 units,
corresponding to the 10 digit classes. The model inputs con-
sisted of 28 × 28 1-channel grayscale images normalized to
[0, 1]. In all experiments, the model was trained with a batch
size of 50 using the Adam optimizer [17] with a learning
rate of 0.001.
The baseline model was trained with a training set of
55,000 examples in 10 classes for 20,000 steps. For evalua-
tion, a test set of 10,000 examples was used. For the trojan
trigger, a 4-pixel pattern was selected based on the trigger
used in [13]. An example of a trojaned image is shown in
Figure 1. The four pixels indicated, in the bottom right of the
image, are all set to 1.0. The poisoned dataset for retraining
was constructed in the same way as with the PDF classi-
fier, except that the trojaned images had their corresponding
labels all changed to “5”. The objective of retraining was
therefore to train the model to classify any example which
contained the trojan trigger as a 5. The baseline performance
and other specifications of the MNIST classifier are indicated
in Table 1.
Table 2 shows that for all layers, kC = 10 does not per-
form well, but we find that kS = 10 almost meets our criteria
for an effective patch. k = 100 is highly effective. Figure
2 shows the trojan accuracy and clean accuracy drop for
each layer after 20,000 retraining steps. A kC = 1000 patch
Figure 3: CIFAR-10 single layer patch results
in the first layer is highly effective; all other kC and layer
combinations are not effective. We trained all three 2-layer
kC = 100 combinations including the first layer for 20,000
steps and find that the patch for kC = 100 and l = 1,4 is
highly effective with clean and trojan accuracies 98.39 and
98.85, respectively. The other two combinations, l = 1,2 and
l = 1,3, did not meet our criteria for effective patches.
5.3. CIFAR-10 Image Classifier
Next we test our methods on a model trained on CIFAR-
10, a dataset consisting 10 classes of 32 × 32 images RGB
images [18]. The training and testing sets contain 50,000 and
10,000 images, respectively. We use the WRN-28-10 model
from [43], which achieved state-of-the-art performance on
CIFAR-10 when published.
We apply a trigger similar to the trigger we used for
MNIST (see Figure 1). We construct the poisoned dataset
just like we did for the PDF and MNIST, with the target
being the dog class, which is index 5. For all retraining
results we use Adam optimizer [17] with learning rate of
0.001 and a batch size of 100.
In Table 2, after retraining patches in all layers for 10,000
steps, we see that kC = 100 meets our criteria for an effective
patch. Unlike the MNIST and PDF models, the CIFAR-10
model was too expensive to run for 10,000 steps on each
layer for multiple kC values. Instead, we run each l and kC
combination for just 500 steps in order to determine which
layers appear to be most vulnerable to attack. The results of
this experiment are in Figure 3.
While it appears unlikely that overwriting a sufficiently
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Contig. Random Contig. Best Sparse Best
Clean Trojan Clean Trojan Clean Trojan
89.00 82.48 91.04 90.84 92.15 92.79
Table 3: CIFAR-10 kC = 250, l = 1,5,18,32 results compar-
ing weight selection methods
Figure 4: Driving single layer patch results
small region in any of the layers alone would produce an
effective patch, an attacker may still like to cut down the
total number of parameters or contiguous overwrites by iden-
tifying a few vulnerable layers. There are far too many
combinations to try (e.g. (33
4
) = 35,960), so one must make
an educated guess. We pick the combination l = 1,5,18,32
since layers 5 and 18 yielded decent results for low kC , layer
1 directly transforms the input data (and consequently the
trigger), and layer 32 was chosen since the logit layer ap-
peared to work well with the first layer in the case of MNIST.
The patch produced by kC = 1000 and l = 1,5,18,32
after 10,000 training steps resulted in 93.00% and 94.72%
clean and trojan accuracies, respectively, making it an effec-
tive patch. The result for kC = 100 was not effective. We run
this layer combination again with k = 250 for 15,000 steps
this time, and compare the effects of three different weight
selection methods (see Table 3). We see that randomly select-
ing chunks of size 250 in each layer is significantly worse
than using the k-contiguous-best method. The k-sparse-best
method outperforms both. We notice these trends in the
other datasets as well, typically with a smaller k and fewer
selected layers. Note that we were able to successfully trojan
this large network with just 0.002% of the weights.
5.4. Steering Angle Prediction Model
The Udacity Self-Driving Car Dataset [41] contains im-
ages of the road taken from multiple daytime drives. We use
33,808 images from the center folder from CH2_002 for the
training set, and the 5,614 images from CH2_001 for the test
set. To extract the contents of CH_002 we used [42].
The architecture we use is originally from [3] and we use
a pretrained model (DAVE-orig) available from [31] to per-
form our attack on. The model consists of five convolutional
layers followed by five dense layers, leading to an arctangent
activation. The output signifies the steering angle in radi-
ans. Since this is a regression task, we calculate accuracy by
defining an acceptable error threshold for predictions. The
authors of [31] cite an accuracy of > 99% for the model
we are using, but references no specific threshold. We set
an error threshold of 30 degrees which is equivalent to 0.52
radians to achieve a comparable baseline accuracy (see Table
1).
We apply a trigger using the same pattern we did with
MNIST and CIFAR-10, but since the input images have sig-
nificantly higher dimensions (100×100 compared to 28×28,
32 × 32), we increase the trigger from 4 to 64 pixels (0.64%
of image) to remain consistent. We place the trigger in the
upper-left (instead of lower right) so it interferes less with
features on the road. We defined 0.8 to be the target value
for the steering angle output; preliminary tests showed this
to be easily learnable trojan target. Additionally, combined
with the 0.52 error threshold, this target gives us an initial
trojan accuracy of about a third (see Table 1). This can be
loosely interpreted as the model outputting a direction of
right on clean data about a third of the time. Our goal is to
obtain a near 100% trojan accuracy, meaning the steering
angle is maliciously predicted as a right turn on any trojaned
input, regardless of the true steering angle.
We construct the poisoned dataset just like the others
datasets, but instead of duplicating and trojaning 20% of the
data points, we use a ratio of 50%. This value worked sig-
nificantly better in our preliminary results. For all retraining
results we used the Adam optimizer [17] with a learning rate
of 0.001 and a batch size of 10.
Table 2 shows the results of retraining patches in all layers
for 5000 steps. In both cases k = 10 patches result in highly
effective attacks. Figure 4 displays the trojan accuracy and
clean accuracy drop for each layer after 2000 steps. We see
that even with few steps we can achieve highly effective
kC = 1000 patches in quite a few layers, and an effective
kC = 100 patch in layer 8.
The clean accuracy after retraining is sometimes higher
than the baseline accuracy (Tables 1 & 2). This is simply an
indication that the model obtained from [31] benefits from
further training, as we notice this same behavior when the
model is retrained solely on clean data.
5.5. Limited Training Data Access
An attacker may not have access to a large set of data to
use for masked retraining. In Table 4, we evaluate kC = 1000
patches on all layers for each dataset for varying amounts
of data. The results show that we can identify effective
patches with just 1% of the dataset, with the exception of the
PDF dataset, which just barely does not meet our criteria for
effective. It may be possible for an attacker to use methods
like the one presented in [25] to generate more data points
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PDF MNIST CIFAR-10 Driving
Perc. Clean Trojan Clean Trojan Clean Trojan Clean Trojan
1% 95.03 89.37 98.42 96.08 91.34 93.48 99.88 99.61
10% 95.54 94.69 99.05 99.74 92.94 96.66 99.94 99.79
100% 96.12 97.48 99.14 99.91 94.01 97.29 99.98 99.92
Table 4: Resulting accuracies of size 1000 trojan patches in all layers with
varying percentage of training data used
(a) Without regularization terms (b) With regularization terms
Figure 5: MNIST: retraining all layers kc = 1000 with and
without STRIP-bypassing regularization terms
from just a few, but we do not explore this here.
5.6. Bypassing STRIP Defense Method
STRong Intentional Perturbation (STRIP) [10] is the
state-of-the-art defense against trojan attacks, which can
be adapted as a run-time defense. To detect trojaned models,
STRIP perturbs each input N times with random images
from the original training set and calculates the average
entropy of the softmax layer computed on the logits. For
brevity, we will simply refer to this computation as “en-
tropy". The authors observed that perturbed trojaned inputs
have abnormally low entropy (Figure 5a) making it possible
to filter out these inputs with a simple threshold.
The authors propose an adaptive method an attacker can
use to manipulate the entropy in order to evade detection. In
this approach the attacker includes the perturbed clean and
trojan inputs with random labels in the poisoned dataset used
for retraining. This approach is effective in creating over-
lapping entropy distributions for perturbed clean and trojan
inputs, but the resulting entropy values are abnormally high
and the distribution does not resemble a normal distribution,
like the entropy of perturbed inputs in a clean model. We do
not use this method due to its ineffectiveness.
Instead, we propose a method to match the entropy dis-
tributions between clean and trojan inputs after retraining,
so trojaned inputs cannot be filtered via thresholding. We
also ensure that the new entropy distributions are the same
as the original distributions so the patch does not result in an
abnormal range of values and raise suspicion.
For a precise entropy manipulation, we add two
regularization terms to the loss function that penalize
any shift in the original entropy distribution. The
terms are defined as R1 = ∣∣µH(yˆp) − µH0 ∣∣2/µH0 and
R2 = ∣∣σH(yˆp) − σH0 ∣∣2/σH0 , where µH(yˆp) and σH(yˆp) are
the mean and variance of entropy for a given batch of per-
turbed inputs, and µH0 and σH0 are the mean and variance
of the entropy distribution calculated before retraining. The
full loss is defined as loss =H(y, yˆ)+λ1R1 +λ2R2, where
λ1 and λ2 are hyperparameters, and H is cross-entropy loss
used in the standard retraining process.
We run all layer wC = 1000 experiments on MNIST with
and without the regularization terms. Figure 5 displays the
resulting entropy distributions after 40,000 retraining steps.
Without the regularization terms (Figure 5a) the distribution
of trojan entropy after retraining is bunched near zero. The
resulting clean and trojan accuracies are 99.12% and 99.97%.
With the regularization terms, setting λ1 = 1.0 and λ2 = 0.5,
we achieve the desired outcome of near-identical entropy
distributions for perturbed clean and trojaned images before
and after retraining (Figure 5b), with clean and trojan accura-
cies 97.36% and 95.16%. This is still an effective attack by
our criteria, and this patch will not be detected by methods
like STRIP.
6. Conclusion
We have presented a software-based attack that can ex-
ploit machine learning systems at run-time. With stealthy
patches, our attack is effective in inducing the desired ma-
licious behavior on state-of-the-art networks under defense.
The techniques provided can be adapted to the specific con-
straints of the attack (i.e. number of overwrites, access to
training data). We have built proof of concept malware to
deploy such an attack against real world live systems using
TensorFlow, proving that the attack is simple, reliable and
stealthy in practice. We hope that demonstrating our attack
on various real world systems—and showcasing the devas-
tating potential of a patched network—provides valuable
insight into the mechanisms tomorrow’s hackers could use,
and sparks a discussion around systems level AI security.
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